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the property to the lessor on the theory of abandonment. 17 Vesting title
in the lessor by abandonment is much more difficult than vesting title by
forfeiture, because to constitute an abandonment in order to give another
party the right to assume title and control of the property, certain elements
must exist. There must be an actual act of abandonment, coupled with
the intention to abandon.' 8 Thus, in those jurisdictions following the
abandonment theory, failure to remove the machinery within a reasonable
length of time, while it may be evidence of abandonment, is not sufficient
to divest the lessee of his rights to the property without proof of the intention to abandon.
Should the lessor and lessee litigate the question pertaining to the
termination date of the lease, it must be understood that the lessee will
not lose title to his property upon the ground that it remained on the
lessor's land an unreasonable lengfh of time.1 9 In such a situation, the
period constituting reasonableness of time would begin from the date on
which the adverse judgment was rendered and would not relate back to
the court determined date of expiration. 20 If the lessor prevents removal
before a reasonable length of time has passed, the lessee may seek injunctive
2
relief in the courts. '
In closing, it might be noted that the trend of some courts is to hold
that the parties may stipulate as to when the machinery and equipment
may be removed, and such stipulations will be binding.22 In effect, these
courts are giving validity to the "any time" provisions, and should the trend
continue, future suits over the right to remove equipment may be governed
by express contract provision, rather than by that resilient commodity, time.
JACK DIXON

PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO DISMISS UNDER THE CODE
AND THE PROPOSED RULES
Like a woman privileged to change her mind, a plaintiff has in the
past been given a right to bring to a halt an action without prejudice to
a later suit during trial.' However, the Federal Rules of Procedure and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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NOTEs

the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for Wyoming have recognized the
"right" as only a privilege, and except for the relatively short time between
filing the petition and the answer date, the plaintiff can dismiss only by
permission of the trial court. The present Wyoming statute gives the
plaintiff an unqualified right to dismiss at any time before final submission
of the cause to the court or jury.2 Our statute is typical of many and the
cases tell us that "final submission" means the time at which the issues
are given to the jury, after argument and charge3 or at any time before
the court directs a verdict for the defendant. 4 The result is that the plaintiff may make a pretty good guess at his chances of surviving a motion for
a directed verdict or a jury decision, and postpone a determination on
the merits at the last possible moment. A few courts go even further and
say that after there has been a final submission of the issues to the court
or jury, the plaintiff's right to dismiss is not cut off entirely but that it
remains in the discretion of the trial court to grant a motion to dismiss
or to withdraw the submission so as to reinstate the plaintiff's original right
to dismiss.5
The code gives an absolute right to dismiss no matter what the
frustration to the defendant. The lawmakers have felt that it is in the
best interests of justice to allow a plaintiff to dismiss an action once
started, and there is undoubtedly much value in a policy which says,
"Once you have begun an action, you are not absolutely bound to prosecute
it in this particular suit or forever forfeit your claim." Giving the plaintiff
such an unqualified right, however, produced the result that a plaintiff
could try again and again until he finally found the trial atmosphere and
jury to his liking best calculated to bring success. On the other hand,
defendant again had to plead, gather witnesses and present his case at a
new trial, or else bring an action himself for a declaratory judgment, thereby assuming the burden of proof.
If a counterclaim or set-off is pleaded before the motion to dismiss,
plaintiff cannot prevent the defendant from prosecuting his claim to final
judgment.0 In Wyoming the right to dismissal before a counterclaim is
pleaded or before final submision is an absolute right over which the
trial court has no discretion. 7 In determining whether or not a motion
for dismissal is made before the counterclaim the mere filing of the motion
2.
3.
4.
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Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 3-3505 (1).
Harris v. Beam, 46 Iowa 118 (1877).
State of Ohio Ex Rel. Strong v. Cook, 124 Ohio St. 478, 179 N.E. 352 (1931); See
annotation 79 A.L.R. 690.
Bee Bldg. Co. v. Dalton, 68 Neb. 38, 93 N.W. 930, 4 Ann. Cas. 508 (1903); St. Louis
S.W. Ry. Co. v. White Sewing Mach. Co., 69 Ark. 431, 64 S.W. 96 (1901); Ashmead
v. Ashmead, 23 Kan. 262 (1880); 17 Am. Jur. 71.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 3-3506. Whether the defendant has pleaded a counter-
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claim or an affirmative defense is a sticky question in itself. See Clark, "Trial of
Actions Under the Code," 11 Corn. L. Q. 482 (1926).
Most decisions are concerned
with the right to a jury trial on issues raised by defendant's plea.
State ex rel. Tibbals v. District Court, 42 Wyo. 214, 292 Pac. 897, 71 A.L.R. 993
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establishes priority without an order of the court s even if the plaintiff has
notice that the defendant intends to make such a claim.9
Federal Rules 41 (a) and (d) take the "right" out of the picture and
leave the plaintiff only a privilege to dismiss. Plaintiff has an absolute
right of dismissal until an answer or motion for summary judgment' 0 is
filed and from that time on he may dismiss only with the permission of
the trial court. Permission is discretionary and subject to conditions
imposed for the protection of the defendant." The most usual condition
is that the plaintiff pay defendant his costs and expenses in the action, and
in the eighth circuit it is error for the trial court not to make such an
2
award to the defendant as a condition to dismissal without prejudice.'
"Cost and expenses" of an action include court costs, reasonable attorneys'
fees, and reasonable expenses in preparing for trial.' 3 If these conditions
are not complied with, the dismissal then becomes prejudicial and a bar
to a later action without further formalities. 14 In a second suit, if plaintiff
has not paid the costs and expenses of the first, the court may require them
paid before a second action may be maintained.' 5 This applies to any
court and would be broad enough to include dismissal in a state court.' 6
Unless the plaintiff can get the defendant to stipulate otherwise,
there can be no second dismissal under any circumstances without prejudice. ". . . a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of
the United States or of any state an action based on or including the
7
same claim."'
Dismissal after answer or motion for summary judgment lies in the
discretion of the court. This is so because of a desire to relieve the defendant of wasted effort in preparation; the usefulness of which would
depend upon the whim or vacillation of the plaintiff.' 8 This practice
originated in the pre-Rules equity practice of the federal courts. That
practice was essentially the same as 41 (a) and was interpreted to mean
that a plaintiff could dismiss so long as the defendant would lose no sub8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
Ibid.
This absolute right is limited also by rule 66 when a receiver has been appointed
and by 23 (c) preventing dismissal of a class action. The right is also subject to
"existing laws of the United States" which refers to dismissal in immigration cases
and prosecutions against persons making false claims against the United States, 28
U.S.C.A. 380.
Evans v. Teche Lines, 112 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1940); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (2).
Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Huffman, 134 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1943).
Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 148 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1945); M.
Welters v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours Corp., 1 F.R.D. 551

(D. Minn. 1941).
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DeFillipis v. Chrysler Sales Corp., 116 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1940).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d).
But when the plaintiff cannot afford to pay those costs, the trial court may waive
them. Huskey v. U.S., 28 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Tenn. 1939).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1).
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Rules Advisory Committee, Note 28 U.S.C.A. 380.

NOTES

stantial rights; at that point the court's discretion ended. 19 The mere
prospect of further litigation or litigation in a state court was not substantial, 20 though there is some authority to the effect that loss of the
federal forum in exchange for a trial in a state court could very well be
21
substantial.
Because of this similarity the limits placed on the trial court's discretion should be applicable under 41 (a). In drawing the boundaries and
defining the vague term "discretion," the courts have said a dismissal must
be with prejudice to a later action when the motion is made at the end
of the plaintiff's case, 22 when much expense has been caused by taking
evidence and the defendant has obtained a favorable report from a master
24
in chancery, 2 3 or when a matter has merely been referred to a master.
In two cases it was decided that if the verdict is for the defendant, or if
the plaintiff's evidence is not sufficinet to withstand a motion for directed
verdict, he may not dismiss without showing why he couldn't produce
missing elements of his case at the trial land that he could at a later time. 20
As is to be expected there are many cases which agree with the trial
court's denial of dismissal; for example, when the purpose is to prolong
litigation depriving the defendant of substantial rights, 26 when a case has
been long pending and required much preparation, 27 or when the defendant
pleaded estoppel which would amount to a defeasance of a lien claimed by
a plaintiff and the defense would be endangered by a transfer after a
28
dismissal.
In granting dismissal the court has no authority to assess anything in
the way of special damages as was pointed out in United Motors Service v.
Tropic-Aire.29 To recover damages other than losses incurred by reason
of preparing for the trial, such as injury to business reputation or loss of
profits, a defendant must rely upon an action for malicious prosecution
0
or the bond given by a plaintiff seeking an injunction.3
At the other end of the field, few cases were found holding the trial
court must grant a dismissal without prejudice. Conceivably a court could
abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss, but since "discretion" is a word
19.

Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 171 U.S. 138, .18 S.Ct. 808,
43 L.Ed. 108 (1898).

20.
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E. 1. DuPont DeNemours Corp., 1 F.R.D. 551 (D. Minn. 1941),.
International Shoe Co. v. Cool, 154 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1946).
Smith v. Carlisle, 228 F. 666 (5th Cir. 1916).
American Bell Telephone Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 69 F. 666 (1st Cir. 1895);
Cert. Denied 166 U.S. 721.
Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Corp., 53 F.Supp. 97 (E.D. Mo. 1943); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1939).
Henjes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 39 F.Supp. 418 (E.D. N.Y. 1941).
Rollison v Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 176 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1949); Walker v.
Spencer, 123 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1941).
Stephens v. The Railroads, 4 F.97 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880), Aff'd. 114 U.S. 663 (1885).
57 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1932).
M. Welters v. E. I. Dupont DeNemours Corp., I F.R.D. 551 (D. Minn. 1941).
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which has little meaning in the absence of a fact situation, there is little
profit in trying to form a rule in the abstract. The district court in Minnesota has said that a defendant cannot keep a plaintiff from dismissing just
because defendant has discovery proceedings pending and would lose his
right to discovery if the action were brought in the state court.8 '
The Federal Rules set the pattern from which the Proposed Wyoming
Rules were cut, and from that fact comes the chief value in a discussion of
this sort. The Proposed Rules differ only in that the provision of 41 (a)
(2) permitting the court no discretion in dismissing when a counterclaim
is pleaded which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication is
omitted. This proviso was not necessary for it was designed to solve a
problem which could only come up in a federal court. Without it a plaintiff with a claim within the jurisdiction of the federal courts could dismiss
and deprive the court of jurisdiction over a counterclaim that did not have
within itself grounds for federal jurisdiction.
To review the difference between the Code and the Proposed Rules
is to point out the advantages of the later. At present plaintiff can drop
out at any time whether or not that inconveniences the defendant and the
court. If controlled by rule 41 (a), the absolute right to dismiss exists only
until an answer has been filed; thereafter there is no inflexible rule but
one which is applied by the court to fit the circumstances in arriving at a
fair answer to the problem of conflicting rights. - Under our present code
the plaintiff may dismiss any number of times while the rules limit him
to one unless the defendant agrees to second without prejudice. Plaintiff
may now dismiss regardless of the cost he imposes on the defendant at
each attempt without having to pay these expenses, but a court guided by
the Rules would be authorized, and in most cases compelled, to make him
pay costs to the defendant.
R. S.

STURGES

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WYOMING'S OIL AND GAS
COMPULSORY POOLING PROVISION
Lack of understanding of the nature of oil and gas in the early history
of its production has led to some seemingly difficult propositions in reconciling common law property concepts with conservation and regulation
of the production of oil and gas. The old rule of capture laid down in
19071 that the owner of a tract could drill as many wells wherever he
wished without regard to others and the consequent competitive drilling
resulted in such waste and expense that need for some regulation became
imperative. Stemming from this need a variety of conservation statutes
31.
1.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1).
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801

(1907).

